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THE SUPREME COURT AND THE MISSOURI HUMANITARIAN
DOCTRINE IN THE YEARS 1950 AND 1951
WILLIAM H. BECKER, JR.*
Suppose that the operators of two automobiles are approaching each
other, on a collision course at equal rates of speed. Suppose each is negli-
gently inattentive and unaware of the imminence of collision and probable
personal injury to both. Suppose that each automobile is in good working
order and that each of the operators could avoid the imminent collision by
timely action by the means and appliances at hand. But suppose that
neither does take any action to avoid the collision of their automobiles and
suppose that both suffer substantial personal injuries as a result of the
collision.
Under such circumstances neither automobile operator is in a position
to recover for personal injuries on- the grounds of primary common law or
statutory negligence, because each is guilty of contributory negligence in
failing to look out for other vehicles.
In Missouri, however, each operator can make a submissible case
against the other under the formula of the humanitarian rule. And al-
though the humanitarian rule has existed in Missouri for many years, we
do not yet know the answer to these important questions: Can each of the
injured automobile operators, in the same action, by claim and counterclaim,
recover damages for personal injuries from the other? (Some competent au-
thorities think so.,) Or, may neither recover against the other since they are
equally at fault? Or, does the first to file his action have the sole right of
recovery under the humanitarian rule?
Only when these important questions are answered by the Supreme
Court of Missouri, will we know what this humanitarian doctrine is and
what its future will be. The humanitarian doctrine is facing a pragmatic
test.
DISTINCTION BETWEEN LAST CLEAR CHANcE RULE AND
HUMANITARIAN RULE
Over the years the Bench and Bar of Missouri have come to use the
terms "humanitarian doctrine," "humanitarian negligence," and "humani-
tarian rule" without distinguishing between common law last clear chance
*Attorney, Columbia. LL.B., University of Missouri, 1932.
1. See TRusT, CONSTRUCTING AND REVIEWING INSTRUCTIONS 245 (1945).
(32)
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cases and the common law last clear chance rule, and the true humanita-
rian rule.
Under the common law last clear chance rule, there are three typical
cases wherein an injured party is permitted to recover damages despite or
regardless of his own contributory negligence. Hardly any one challenges
the basic soundness of a common law last clear chance rule in the three
typical situations. The common law last clear chance rule in the three
typical fact situations has a good logical foundation; namely, that the party
against whom recovery is permitted is chargeable with a greater degree of
fault in the last critical moments when, by timely action, he might avoid
injury to the party permitted to recover. And what is equally important in
the practical administration of the last clear chance ride is the fact that, in
common law last clear chance cases where both. parties are injured, they
cannot simultaneously make cases for recovery each against the other, upon
any assumed single version of the facts. So, the courts have devised the
common law last clear chance rule, soundly basing the rule upon relative
degrees of fault; and, at the same time, in an excellent display of judicial
craftsmanship, avoided the dilemma facing the Missouri courts by refusing
to extend the rule to fact situations where the parties were equally at fault
and had equal opportunities to avoid the casualty.
It is submitted that a great number of the cases dealt with by the
Missouri courts as cases under the humanitarian rule are really common
law last clear chance cases, and could be determined without the reference
to the humanitarian rule. Probably, before there can be any resolution of
the dilemma presented by the humanitarian rule, the courts will have to
restrict the use of the words "humanitarian rule" to the true humanitarian
case, illustrated as Case No. 4 hereinafter.
For the purposes of further reference and for the purposes of definition,
the three typical common law last clear chance cases are stated as follows:
Comnn Law Last Clear Chance Case No. 1:
The peril to plaintiff's person, property, or both results from
physical helplessness caused by plaintiff's lack of care. Defendant
actually discovers the peril in time, thereafter, with safety to him-
self, to avoid damage to plaintiff by the exercise of care. This is a
simple last clear chance case. The plaintiff may recover for personal
injury and property damage despite his negligence in practically
all common law jurisdictions. This result is well settled in Missouri
19521
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and not expected to be challenged; but this is not a humanitarian
negligence case.
Conmmon Law Last Clear Chance Case No. 2:
The facts are the same as in Case 1, except that the defend-
ant does not actually discover the peril, but in the exercise of care
he should have discovered it in time to avoid damage, by the exer-
cise of care and with safety to himself. As in Case 1, a majority of
courts permit plaintiff to recover for personal injury or property
damage under the last clear chance rule. This is not a humanita-
rian negligence case, and the rule is not expected to be challenged.
Common Law Last Clear Chance Case No. 3:
The peril to plaintiff's person, property or both, results from
plaintiff's negligent inattentiveness (obliviousness in Missouri ju-
dicial parlance). Defendant (as in Case 1) actually discovers the
peril in time, thereafter, to avoid damage to plaintiff by the exer-
cise of care. This is a last clear chance case. It is not a humanita-
rian case. The rule that plaintiff may recover seems settled in Mis-
souri and elsewhere. There appears to be no serious challenge to
the soundness of the right of plaintiff to recover in this case.
The Missouri courts have added a fourth type of case wherein the in-
jured party may recover despite or regardless of his contributory negligence.
It is this fourth type of case which is the subject of the true humanitarian
doctrine. Under the true humanitarian doctrine, an injured party, whose
peril is caused by his own negligent inattentiveness (obliviousness) can
recover against another who was also negligently inattentive (oblivious),
and not aware of the injured party's peril.
It considering this true humanitarian case, it should be borne in mind
that, upon a single assumed state of facts, each party can make a case for
recovery under the humanitarian rule against the other, provided both
parties suffer personal injuries.
The typical true humanitarian case may be stated as follows:
The injured person is in a position of imminent peril as a re-
sult of his negligent inattentiveness (obliviousness). The injured
1 party could extricate himself from his peril by his own efforts, if
he were aware of his peril and used care. The defendant or party
. against whom claim for damages is made does not actually discover
the peril of the injured party. Nevertheless, in the exercise of care
the party causing injury should have discovered the peril in time
[Vol. 17
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thereafter with safety to himself by the use of care to have avoided
injury to the plaintiff. In other words the party causing injury is
also negligently inattentive (oblivious). The Missouri courts per-
mit recovery by the injured party in this case; and in this respect
are more liberal than courts of other jursidictions.
For years, during the horse and buggy age, there was little occasion to
question the soundness of the operation of the Missouri humanitarian rule,
since the defendant in the ordinary case was operating a railroad train and
sustained no personal injury. The plaintiffs were usually pedestrians or
occupants of light horse drawn vehicles, neither of them capable of causing
injury to the defendant operator of the locomotive and train involved. So
for many years, the Missouri courts without unsolvable difficulties, applied
the Missouri humanitarian rule, merged with it the common law last clear
chance rule, and referred to the combination of the two rules as the "hu-
manitarian doctrine." But times changed. The automobile displaced the
horse, and motorists began to drive their motor vehicles into each other
with ever increasing fervor. Liability insurance became common, and it be-
came possible for severely injured persons to secure verdicts in automobile
personal injury cases from juries with some regularity if the plaintiff could
avoid a directed verdict by the trial and appellate courts. Sometimes the
true humanitarian rule offered the only possible theory of recovery.
Where, by chance, one operator sustained personal injuries in an au-
tomobile collision and the other did not, no difficulty in administering the
humanitarian rule was readily apparent. It is true that attempts were pro-
bably made from time to time to assert the rule defensively in behalf of the
uninjured defendant, but these attempts were rebuffed with the ready an-
swer that the rule grew out of humane considerations and applied only in
favor of persons sustaining personal injury.
But there were collisions in which both operators suffered substantial
personal injuries, and both were negligently inattentive and each had equal
opportunity to avoid collision and consequent injury to the other by timely
use of the means and appliances available. What should be the result if, in
such a case, each operator asserts a claim for damages against the other, and
each asserts humanitarian negligence as a defense to the other's claim? For
years a decision of the questions presented has been avoided by the M
souri courts.
Once, a case came to the Supreme Court of Missouri wherein a jury had
rendered verdicts for both plaintiff and defendant. Fortunately, or unfortu-
19521
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nately, as one sees it, the supreme court found it did not have jurisdiction to
entertain the appeal and sent the case to the Kansas City Court of Appeals
for disposition.2 Confronted with the dilemma, the court of appeals grudg-
ingly accepted jurisdiction and was able to find that an erroneous instruc-
tion had been given and approved the granting of a new trial. Again, for-
tunately, or unfortunately, as one sees it, the case was disposed of without
again vexing the appellate courts.3
ThE CASES IN 1950 AND 1951
During the years 1950 and 1951, a substantial number of cases in-
volving the humanitarian rule or the last clear chance rule were decided
by the court en banc. The sole cause defense instruction continued its
stormy career, very nearly becoming exterminated in Janssens v. Thompson. 4
In that case, by a four to three decision, the sole cause defense instruction
survived.5 During 1950 and 1951, the court continued to be pre-occupied
with the propriety of instructions, and the submissibility of last clear chance
and humanitarian cases. Sometimes the controversy over instructions in-
volved more than procedural questions. Frequently, consideration of the
propriety of an instruction turned upon factors touching the nature of the
doctrine itself. In fact, much of the disagreement and unsettled condition
of the decisions results from the attempt of the court to make the doctrine
a workable one in automobile cases without radical reexamination of the
underlying principles. There is one aspect of the decisions for the years 1950
and 1951 which may be applauded by most practitioners. In some instances,
the court has undertaken not only to point out error in instructions, but has
followed this negative declaration with an exposition and example of what
it considered to be a proper instruction.6 In Hunt v. Chicago, M. St. P. &
P. R.R.,7 the court en banc analyzed the "almost escaping cases" based upon
the once leading case of Gann v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry.,8 and overruled the
2. Ashbrook v. Willis, 338 Mo. 226, 89 S.W. 2d 659 (1936).
3. Ashbrook v. Willis, 231 Mo. App. 460, 100 S. W. 2d 943 (1937). See the
amusing opinion of Presiding Judge Shain therein, protesting the action of the
Supreme Court in transferring the case to the court of appeals.
4. 228 S.W. 2d 743 (Mo. 1950).
5. The history of this instruction in Missouri is ably covered in Dean Mc-
Cleary's article, Tire Defense of Sole Cause in Missouri Negligence Cases, 10 Mo.
L. REv. 1 (1945).
6. See Harrington v. Thompson, 243 S.W. 2d 519 (Mo. 1951) and Colvin v.
Mills, 232 S.W. 2d 961 (Mo. 1950).
7. 225 S.W. 2d 738 (Mo. 1949).
8. 319 Mo. 214, 6 S.W. 2d 39 (1928).
[Vol. 17
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Gann case as that case was understood by some members of the Bar.
On the whole, the opinions for 1950 and 1951 in this field appear to be
written with more care and understanding than in the past, and there ap-
pears to be greater participation by all the members of the court in each
case. Now, there is less evidence of the "one man opinion" in this field. So
far as stability in the rules and reliability of the cases are concerned, this is
a healthy development.
The St. Louis Court of Appeals transferred to the Supreme Court the
case of McClanahan v. St. Louis Public Service Company,9 because of the
apparent conflict in the decisions of the supreme court dealing with a situa-
tion where the same negligent act creates the imminent peril and immedi-
ately produces the injury. For an example of the apparent conflict see
Bobos v. Krey Packing Co.10 and Blaser v. Coleman." This is a prob-
lem common to last clear chance cases as well as humanitarian cases.
A definite ruling is to be expected from the supreme court in 1952. Judge
Houser in the McClanahan case carefully analyzes the problem and illus-
trates the confusion existing in this area. The theory is suggested that, at
least in these cases, the rationale of the humanitarian rule is that the de-
fendant's negligence is the equivalent of wilful wanton negligence rendering
the contributory negligence immaterial, citing Judge Gant's opinion in Cox
v. Terminal R. Assn. of St. Louis.'2 The ruling of the supreme court will be
awaited with interest by the Bar.
Cases Decided by the Court En Banc
Jaussens v. Thompson.13 This was a death action arising out of a motor
truck collision at a grade crossing of a railroad track by a slippery, muddy,
gravel road. The court classified the case as a "muddy road" case wherein
the apparent difficulties of the motor vehicle operator are sufficient to indi-
cate obliviousness or negligent inattention.
The case was submitted solely upon "humanitarian" negligence in failing
to slacken the speed of the train. There apparently was full concurrence in
the decision that the case was submissible. However, it is significant that
the Judges Tipton, Conkling, and Clark, in a special concurring opinion by
9. 242 S.W. 2d 267 (Mo. App. 1951).
10. 317 Mo. 10S, 296 S.W. 151 (1927).
11. 358 Mo. 157, 213 S.W. 2d 420 (1948).
12. 331 Mo. 910, 55 S.W. 2d 685, 1. c. 686 (1932).
13. 228 S.W. 2d. 743 (Mo. 1950).
19521
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Judge Tipton, reached the conclusion that a sole cause instruction has no
part in a humanitarian or last clear chance case. There is no assurance that
this minority opinion will not become a majority opinion at some time in the
future. Unless Judge Hollingsworth, who has succeeded one of the minority,
aligns himself with the majority the giving of a sole cause instruction in a
humanitarian case now becomes a calculated risk. The majority refers to
Dean McCleary's excellent article upon the sole cause instruction.14
The Janssens case is also notable for its approval of a defense instruc-
tion in a crossing case and for its rejection of two defense instructions, one
of which defined the term "imminent peril" and the other of which under-
took to submit sole cause. The sole cause instruction in question was disap-
proved by all members of the court en banc because of its failure to
hypothesize a factual situation which would exonerate the defendants, and
for its tendency to inject antecedent contributory negligence into the case as
a defense. In the majority opinion, Judge Hyde not only pointed out the
error in the sole cause instruction in review, but undertook, with admirable
courage, to set forth what would constitute a good instruction.
The sole cause defense instruction in humanitarian cases has been the
subject of continual change of requirements by the supreme court, and it
now appears it may not survive at all in humanitarian and last clear chance
cases.
The Janssens case was a combination last clear chance case and humani-
tarian negligence case. Apparently, the jury were permitted to find for the
plaintiff on the ground that the factual situation permitted a recovery under
any of the four fact situations.
(The approval of the defense instruction was qualified. The opinion is
subject to the interpretation that a trial court might find the instruction
misleading and be sustained by the Supreme Court.)
Pearson v. Kansas City Public Service Company.15 This case involved
the striking of a pedestrian by a street car at an irregular street intersection
in Kansas City. The case was submitted solely on "humanitarian" negli-
gence in failing to stop. The plaintiff was in inextricable peril at the time
the defendant's duty arose. Consequently, this is a last clear chance case
number two or number three. The case was submitted in the alternative as
a case of discovered or discoverable peril. The principal issue in the case
14. Supra, n. 5.
15. 225 S.W. 2d 742 (Mo. 1950).
[Vol. 17
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turned on factual interpretation of the record and prior testimony of the
plaintiff. The court held that the plaintiff's prior testimony did not destroy
his testimony at the trial, and that the case was submissible.
Hillhouse v. Thompson.6 This case involved a daytime motor truck-
train grade crossing collision. The case was submitted on "humanitarian"
negligence in failing to slacken and to warn in the conjunctive as is permitted
by Missouri practice. The deceased motor vehicle operator, who was killed
as a result of the collision, was in peril because of his negligent inattentive-
ness (obliviousness). The defendant was either aware of the peril or neg-
ligently inattentive. The principal instruction submitted last clear chance
negligence (Case 3) and true humanitarian negligence (Case 4). The opin-
ion is notable for the reason that the court en banc approves the opinion of
Division No. 1 in Harrington. v Thompson, 7 in its interpretation of prior
decisions concerning the necessity of submitting to the jury a finding as to
the exact place where the injured party came into peril.
The opinion was written by Judge Ellison and concurred in fully by
Judges Leedy and Tipton. Judges Dalton, Hyde, Hollingsworth, and Conk-
ling concurred in the result only. The concurring opinion was written
by Judge Dalton and is actually the majority opinion. Judge Dalton's
majority opinion holds that a submissible case was made only upon the issue
of failure to slacken speed. It further holds that while no submissible case
was made upon the issue of failure to warn, error in submitting that issue
was not prejudicial since the jury was required to find that both negligent
omissions occurred. In view of the failure of a majority of the court to con-
cur in Judge Ellison's opinion, it might be dangerous to accept Judge Elli-
son's opinion as a guide to the future.
In the Hillhouse case, the Springfield Court of Appeals, which rendered
an opinion therein, held that evidence offered on pleaded primary negli-
gence, which assignment of primary negligence was later abandoned, consti-
tuted error. Judge Ellison's opinion, for what it is worth, reversed the Spring-
field Court of Appeals on this issue.,'
Cable v. Chicago, B. & Q. 1.R.'9 This was an action for damages for
personal injuries resulting from a grade crossing collision between a truck
16. 243 S.W. 2d 531 (Mo. 1951).
17. 243 S.W. 2d 519 (Mo. 1951).
18. The opinion of the Springfield Court of Appeals is reported in 240 S.W.
2d 224 (Mo. App. 1951).
19. 236 S.W. 2d 328 (Mo. 1951).
1952]
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operated by the plaintiff and one of the defendant's trains. The case was
submitted solely on "humanitarian" negligence in failing to warn.
The plaintiff was unaware of the approach of the train. The fireman
was aware of the approach of the truck. The question was whether the obliv-
iousness of the plaintiff was reasonably apparent. Plaintiff's evidence
showed that he approached the track on a serpentine road with his view ob-
scured by high weeds; that at a point approximately thirty-eight feet from
the crossing, he slowed nearly to a stop, shifted gears, and gradually in-
creased his speed until he ran into the path of the train. During its last
approach, the truck never exceeded three miles per hour and could have
been stopped within two feet. Since the defendant was aware of the truck's
approach, this was really a common law last clear chance case number three.
In the course of the opinion, a court of appeals case cited by the railroad
was overruled, 20 because it unduly limited the extent of the zone of peril
wherein the plaintiff was oblivious. The time element involved in the Cable
case from the time peril arose until the collision was from eight to fifteen
seconds. The plaintiff's principal instruction was held to be erroneous be-
cause it permitted a finding that imminent peril existed when the plaintiff
was only approaching a position of imminent peril. The court indicated that
the instruction "submitted no proper finding of facts to guide the jury in
determining the issuable fact of imminent peril or in reaching a conclusion
as to when, where, and how the position of peril came into existence, or as
to when the duty of the defendant under the humanitarian doctrine arose
to sound a warning."
It should be noted that this case was also explained, clarified, and
limited by the subsequent opinions in Newman v. St. Louis Publio Service
Co., 2' Harrington v. Tkompson,22 and Hillhouse v. Thompson.23 In drafting
a principal instruction in a crossing case, it should be sufficient to comply
with the requirements of the Harrington case, supra.
Hunt v. Chicago, M. St. P. and P. R.R.24 This was an action arising
out of an automobile-train collision at a grade crossing. In the trial court,
evidence was offered upon primary negligence and "humanitarian" negli-
gence in failing to warn as well as in failing to slacken speed. The case was
20. Thomasson v. Henwood, 235 Mo. App. 1211, 146 S.W. 2d 88 (1940).
21. Not yet reported.
22. 243 S.W. 2d 519 (Mo. 1951).
23. 243 S.W. 2d 531 (Mo. 1951).
24. 225 S.W. 2d 738 (Mo. 1949).
[Vol. 17
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submitted solely on "humanitarian" negligence in failing to slacken speed.
After verdict and judgment for the plaintiff, the trial court set aside the
verdict and entered judgment for the defendant upon the ground that no
submissible case was made upon the negligence submitted, namely, failure
to slacken speed. On appeal the plaintiff challenged the ruling of the trial
court and asserted that in any event the cause should be reversed and re-
manded so that he might submit the cause upon other assignments of negli.
gence. A divided court affirmed the judgment of the trial court, holding that
no submissible case was made upon the grounds submitted, and that all
other grounds for submission of the case had been deliberately abandoned.
First, the majority opinion used precise language in describing the facts
involved. The case is described as involving a plaintiff who "was in a posi-
tion of inextricable discoverable peril." (This clearly described a last clear
chance case number three). The evidence of the plaintiff showed he stopped
the car ten or twelve feet north of the north rail of the railroad track, looked
for trains, then got in the car and drove at a gradually accelerated speed
across the track and needed but an additional one-fourth of a second to have
escaped by passing beyond the path of the train. Plaintiff's evidence also
showed he saw the train a hundred feet away, travelling twenty to twenty-
five miles per hour, and that the train did not diminish speed in the last one
hundred feet. This was one of the "almost escaping" cases. In holding no
submissible case made, the court pointed out there was no evidence of the
width of the overhang of the train, and no evidence as to the amount of the
reduction of the speed of the train possible in the last hundred feet, and
called attention to the failure of the plaintiff to take into account reaction
time and the time lag between the application of the brakes and the moment
the brakes began to reduce the speed of the train.
The case was a close one, and the difference between the majority and
the minority opinion apparently depended on factual interpretation of the
record. The most notable feature of the case is the ruling that the case
should not be remanded for a new trial upon other assignments of negligence
presumably proven. If other assignments of negligence had been proved the
motion for directed verdict at the close of all the evidence could not be sus-
tained. But, under the rule of this case, the failure to instruct upon all the
assignments constitutes an abandonment of those proved and the motion
for directed verdict is presented in a new light after verdict and judgment.
This does not seem to be desirable. It seems to visit a penalty of some sort
upon counsel who may in good faith choose to submit the case upon the
1952]
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theory that seems to be soundest at the time. Two lessons for those dealing
with the humanitarian doctrine can be drawn from this case; namely, (1)
do not abandon submission on primary negligence unless you are certain of
your submission upon last clear chance or humanitarian negligence; and (2)
do not rely upon negligence in failing to slacken speed unless you have posi-
tive evidence that the speed of the train or other vehicle can be slackened
sufficiently to permit the plaintiff to escape after making proper allowance
for reaction time and the time lag in the mechanical operation of the brakes.
The leading case of Gannp v. Chicago R. . & P. Ry., 21 involving an "al-
most escaping" situation to the extent that it has been interpreted as per-
mitting submission without positive evidence of the reduction of speed under
the circumstances, is limited or overruled. The opinion represents a tendency
toward more conservative application of the last clear chance and humani-
tarian negligence rules.
Dister v. Ludwig.26 This was a suit for personal injuries suffered by a
pedestrian who walked fast across a city street to reach a safety zone and
board a street car. In so doing, he was struck by an automobile approaching
from his left. The case was submitted upon "humanitarian" negligence in fail-
ing to stop, swerve, slacken speed, or warn in the disjunctive. The plaintiff
was fully aware of the approach of the defendant's automobile. Consequently,
this could not be a true humanitarian case. The supreme court held that a
submissible case was made in failing to stop, swerve, and slacken speed. On
the other hand, it was properly held that there was no submissible case made
on the failure to warn, since the plaintiff was not oblivious to his peril. The
principal opinion written by Judge Hollingsworth is based on inferences con-
cerning speeds and distances which would justify submission of the case. The
caliculations are precise and considerable data is derived from judicial notice
as to stopping distances of an automobile driven at fifteen miles per hour,
and of the ordinary walking gait of man. Judge Tipton dissented and Judge
Conkling concurred in the result, expressing doubt as to the conclusion of
the submissibility of the case. The case (and others decided in 1951) is an
indication, if a slight one, that Judge Hollingsworth, the newest member of
the court, will not be unusually conservative in last clear chance and hu-
manitarian negligence cases when dealing with factual problems.
25. 319 Mo. 214, 6 S.W. 2d 39 (1928).
26. 240 S.W. 2d 694 (Mo. 1951).
[Vol. 17
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Davis v. Kansas City Public Service Company.27 This case grew out of
a streetcar-automobile collision at a metropolitan street intersection. The
streetcar overtook a passenger automobile turning left across the tracks in
front of the streetcar. The plaintiff was oblivious of the peril. The defend-
ant was either aware of the peril, or negligently inattentive. The case was
submitted solely on last clear chance or humanitarian negligence in failing
to slacken or to warn. By a four to three majority the court en banc held
that a submissible case was made. The principal opinion written by Judge
Ellison contained an exhaustive statement of the evidence, concluding that
the motions for directed verdict should have been overruled. Judges Hol-
lingsworth, Dalton, and Leedy concurred. Judges Tipton and Hyde con-
curred in Judge Conkling's dissenting opinion. The difference between the
majority and the minority seemed to be a difference of factual interpretation.
Judge Ellison, who wrote the majority opinion, usually is found to be con-
servative in cases where an extension of the humanitarian principle is in-
volved. Judge Conkling, author of the dissenting opinion, continued in
this case to be conservative in permitting inferences to be drawn from facts
in evidence. The basis of the humanitarian doctrine was not discussed or
examined in this case.
It is submitted this case could have been based on primary negli-
gence in several particulars. A refusal to apply the true humanitarian rule
would not have resulted in a directed verdict, under either the majority or
the minority opinion.
Newman v. St. Louis Public Service Co.28 This was an action for dam-
ages resulting from personal injury to the plaintiff, a pedestrian, who was
struck by defendant's streetcar while crossing a city street at a point other
than the regular intersection. Plaintiff was confused, negligently inatten-
tive, and moving to and fro in the path of the streetcar while oblivious to
its approach. The case was submitted under the last clear chance or humani-
tarian doctrine for failure to warn or to stop. In this case, the court upheld
a principal instruction which did not hypothesize specific facts showing the
place or time plaintiff came into peril. Speaking through Judge Tipton, the
court, en banc, distinguished and clarified the case of Cable z. C. B. & Q.
Ry. 21 on the requirements of an instruction concerning the place peril
arises. As held by Division No. 1 in Harrington v. Thompson,"0 the court
27. 233 S.W. 2d 669 (Mo. 1950).
28. November 12, 1951 (not yet reported).
29. 236 S.W. 2d 338 (Mo. 1951).
30. 243 S.W. 2d 519 (Mo. 1951), infra.
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holds that the term "position of imminent peril" is itself an issuable fact
and no hypothesis of the time, place and manner of the arising of peril is
required of an instruction submitting humanitarian or last clear chance neg-
ligence. Here Judge Tipiton shows liberality in technical matters of trial prac-
tice.
DivisION NUMBER ONE
Cosentino v. Heffelfnger.31 This case arose out of a daytime intersec-
tional automobile collision. It did not involve a true humanitarian negli-
gence case, because the plaintiff was not oblivious or negligently inattentive.
It was held that no submissible case was made, because the plaintiff was
aware of the defendant's approach and consequently did not come into a
position of imminent peril until the plaintiff was unable to avoid injury by
his own efforts. The defendant was negligently inattentive, but was unable
to avoid the collision by action taken after the plaintiff came into a position
of imminent, inextricable peril. The real question involved was whether or
not the plaintiff was able to make a common law last clear chance case num-
ber three. This is the type of ruling which has caused critics to remark that
the law gives greater protection to the negligently inattentive driver than to
the attentive one. But that is an infirmity, if such it be, of the common law
last clear chance rule, and not of the true humanitarian rule.
Branscwrm v. Glaser.2 This was a death case arising out of an automo-
bile-tank truck collision at a highway intersection. The operator of the auto-
mobile was killed and damages were sought because of his death. Both
primary and "humanitarian" negligence were pleaded. The case was sub-
mitted solely on "humanitarian" negligence. There was no evidence in the
record of distances, speed, and relative positions necessary to make either
a last clear chance or humanitarian negligence case. It was clear that the
plaintiff was negligently inattentive and thereby guilty of contributory neg-
ligence. A case if made would have been a case type three or four. There is
simply not sufficient evidence of the essential facts to analyze the case.
Frandeka v. St. Louis Public Service Co.,3 This case grew out of a day-
time motorbus-automobile collision at a street intersection. It was an un-
usual case in that the plaintiff was the operator of a fire chief's automobile
speeding through downtown St. Louis to answer an alarm. The case was
31. 229 S.W. 2d546 (Mo. 1950).
32. 234 S.W. 2d 626 (Mo. 1950).
33. 234 S.W. 2d .40 (Mo. 1950).
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submitted solely on primary negligence. On appeal, the supreme court, in
a carefully considered opinion by Judge Hyde, held that the case was not
submissible on primary negligence because of contributory negligence of the
plaintiff. But the court further held that a humanitarian case was made for
failure of the motorbus operator to slacken and swerve the course of the bus.
This was a true humanitarian case upon the theory that the case was held
to be submissible. It appears that the plaintiff was negligently inattentive
and oblivious, and that the defendant was negligently inattentive and obliv-
ious. The time element involved was two seconds. The fact situation is not
likely to recur often, but the opinion holds that a humanitarian case may be
submitted, under proper circumstances, upon failure of the defendant to
slacken and swerve when neither slackening or swerving alone would suffice
to avoid injury to the plaintiff. This is a humanitarian case number four.
Eller v. Crowell."4 This is a personal injury action brought by a passen-
ger involved in the collision of two automobiles. The two automobiles col-
lided head-on while both were astride the center line of a four-lane highway.
While the drivers of both automobiles were sued, the jury returned a verdict
against the driver of the automobile in which the plaintiff was an occupant
and found in favor of the other driver involved. There was no question of
submissibility of the case, and the principal humanitarian doctrine instruc-
tion was held to be free of error even though it did not require a finding that
timely action could be taken by the appellant with safety to others upon the
highway. It was pointed out by Judge Hollingsworth that there was no
indication in the record that action under the humanitarian doctrine would
likely cause injury to others. It is indicated, of course, that the ruling would
be otherwise were there substantial evidence in the record that action under
the humanitarian doctrine would cause injury to others. This is apparently
a true humanitarian number four case, or in thealternative, a common law
last clear chance case number three. It could have been submitted on pri-
mary negligence alone.
Sc ineider v. St Louis Public Service Co.' 5 This is a personal injury
action by a passenger on a motorbus to recover for damages sustained in a
motorbus-motor tractor collision at a street intersection in St. Louis. An
instruction on humanitarian or last clear chance negligence, which clearly
did not comply with the basic requirements of such an instruction, was held
34. 238 S.W. 2d 310 (Mo. 1951).
35. 238 S.W. 2d 350 (Mo. 1951).
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to be erroneous. This is the type of case which is easily submitted on pri-
mary negligence. The passenger is chargeable with no contributory negli-
gence. In any event, the passenger is sufficiently helpless and in inextricable
peril so far as his own efforts are concerned. The case as submitted is a last
clear chance case number one, or number two, depending upon whether the
peril was discovered or discoverable.
Lilly v. Boswell." This was a passenger's suit growing out of a daytime
collision between two automobiles at a street intersection in Cape Girardeau.
This case was submitted solely on the "humanitarian" doctrine on fail-
ure of defendant to stop, slow, or swerve. It was held that a submissible
case was made. This case could have been submitted on primary negligence
without difficulty. As submitted, it was a last clear chance case number
three or a humanitarian case numter four.
Fantin v. L. W. Hays.37 This case involved a collision between two
automobiles meeting on a curved icy bridge on a highway. The plaintiff lost
control of his automobile and collided with the defendant's oncoming truck
on the plaintiff's left hand side of the highway. The defendant secured a ver-
dict in its favor on plaintiff's claim. On appeal, the court upheld a converse
defense instruction and a sole cause instruction based on plaintiff's operation
of his automobile so as to cause the same to "suddenly go from a position of
safety on the right side of the bridge to the left of said bridge and closely in
front" of defendant's truck. This was a common law last clear chance case
number one or two. The plaintiff was in inextricable peril according to his
theory.
Lefkowitz v. Kansas City Public Service Co.' 8 This was a personal
injury action for damages resulting from a pedestrian-street car collision
at a pedestrian crossing of a city street. The plaintiff saw the street car
200 to 300 feet away, but thereafter looked away and was oblivious to
her peril on her version of the facts. In reversing a judgment for the defend-
ant the court held the following instruction to be error, because it advised
the jury there was no duty to act when there was "likelihood of injury":
"The Court instructs the jury that this case is submitted solely
on what is known as the humanitarian doctrine. Now under such
doctrine, the operator, Harry Jenson, owed the plaintiff no legal
duty whatever unless and until after plaintiff was actually in what
is defined below as a position of 'iminent peril,' if she was, from the
26. 242 S.W. 2d 73 (Mo. 1951).
37. 242 S.W. 2d 509 (Mo. 1951).
38. 242 S.W. 2d 530 (Mo. 1951).
[Vol. 17
15
Becker: Becker: Supreme Court and Missouri Humanitarian  1950-1951
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1952
HUMANITARIAN DOCTRINE
movements of said street car, and under circumstances that would
charge a reasonably careful street car operator with knowledge that
such 'imminent peril" existed to the plaintiff.
"By such 'imminent peril' the Court does not mean the mere
possibility of danger, or of injury, to her, but the Court means cer-
tain, immediate and impending peril of injury to her, and a likeli-
hood of injury would not and does not constitute suck imminent
peril, or a position of imminent peril that would place upon the op-
erator of the street car any duty towards the plaintiff." (Emphasis
added).
This case is in the alternative a common law last clear chance case num-
ber three or true humanitarian case number four.
Harrington v. Thompson.39 This action grew out of a daytime train-
automobile collision at an unobstructed grade crossing. The plaintiff was
negligently inattentive. The defendant saw and knew of the peril. This is a
common law last clear chance case, type number three. The case was sub-
mitted on "humanitarian" negligence in failing to warn. The time inter-
vening between the moment the peril arose and the last moment for the
automobile operator to act to save himself was from two to two and a half
seconds. In a carefully prepared opinion by Judge Coil it was held, with full
concurrence of the court, that a submissible case was made. The opinion is
notable particularily on the question of the proper wording of instructions.
In the first place, the opinion with logical and practical soundness points out
the reasons that the words "approaching the railroad crossing" may be used
while the words "approaching a position of peril" cannot be used properly
in a last clear chance or humanitarian negligence instruction. On this score,
the case of Buehler v. Festus Mercantile Co.40 is followed.
This opinion also undertook to answer the question whether a last clear
chance or humanitarian instruction is required to contain an hypothesis of
the precise time and place at which the peril commences. This question is
answered in the negative.
And finally the opinion has the virtue of undertaking to set out and
frame for future use the proper phrasing of a last clear chance or humani-
tarian negligence instruction in a grade crossing train-auto collision. This
is a hazardous, but certainly a worthy venture. The opinion further under-
took to allay misapprehension resulting from language used in the case of
39. 243 S.W. 2d 519 (Mo. 1951).
40. 343 Mo. 139, 119 S.W. 2d 961 (1938).
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Cable v. Chicago B. & Q. R.R.4 1 The opinion represents an effort to dimin-
ish the confusion existing in the highly technical field of drafting instructions.
DIVISION NUMBER Two
Austin v. Hemperley.42 This case was a death action arising out of a
late afternoon motorbus-automobile collision on a curving, slippery highway.
The bus and the automobile were meeting with the automobile out of con-
trol on the wrong side of the road. The case was submitted on the "humani-
tarian doctrine" in failing to stop. The automobile operator and passenger
were in inextricable peril when two hundred feet distant from the bus. The
evidence showed the bus could not be stopped within a hundred feet. In
a well written opinion, by Judge Westhues, the court held that the plaintiff
made a submissible case. Since the injured party was in inextricable peril,
this was really a common law last clear chance case, number one or number
two.
Colvin v. Mills.43 This case involved a daytime pedestrian-automobile
collision in a city street at a point between intersections. The sole question
on appeal was whether or not the defendant's converse instruction was
proper. It is not made clear (since statement thereof was not necessary to
the decision) what was the precise theory of submission of the case and the
case is difficult to classify. The defendant's converse instruction was held to
be erroneous for failure to take into account the duty of the defendant to dis-
cover the plaintiff in the exercise of care. Judge Leedy, in holding the de-
fendant's converse instruction to be erroneous, took pains to quote an ap-
proved instruction from a prior decision. This represents part of the grow-
ing practice of the court to say what is right as well as what is wrong in the
framing'of instructions.
Harrow v. Kansas City Public Service Co.4 This was a death action
involving a night-time collision of a street car with a pedestrian standing
in the path of the street car waiting for automobile traffic to pass before
crossing from the street car track to the curb. The time element involved
was two seconds. The injured party was negligently inattentive or oblivious
of his peril. The defendant was either aware of the danger to the deceased
or negligently inattentative. The case was submitted solely on "humani-
41. 236 S.W. 2d 328 (Mo. 1951).
42. 228 S.W. 2d 712 (Mo. 1950).
43. 232 S.W. 2d 961 (Mo. 1950).
44. 233 S.W. 2d 644 (Mo. 1950).
17
Becker: Becker: Supreme Court and Missouri Humanitarian  1950-1951
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1952
HUMANITARIAN DOCTRINE
tarian" negligence in failing to stop, to slacken, to warn, all in the disjunctive.
The pedestrian was immobile during the time of his peril and up until struck.
In an opinion by Judge Bohling,, the court held that the plaintiff had failed
to make a case on slackening of speed of the street car. The opinion on this
issue contains the following noteworthy statement:
"The humanitarian negligence involved in a failure to stop differs
from that involved in a failure to warn or slacken speed in that,
broadly put, the avoidance of an impending peril through ability
to stop rests solely with the defendant whereas the avoidance of an
impending peril through a timely warning or a slackening of speed
presupposes cooperative action on the part of the one imperiled in
time to escape."
Plaintiff's principal instruction was held to be erroneous for failure to
limit consideration of defendant's negligence to the time from and after the
condition of imminent peril arose .The case was submissible in the alterna-
tive as a common law last clear chance case number three or a humanitarian
case number four.
Pearson v. Kansas City Ice Company. 45 This case arose out of the death
of a boy who was thrown into the path of an overtaking truck. After being
thrown the boy was in peril and physically unable to escape. The defendant
was aware of the peril of the boy. Consequently, the case was a true com-
mon law last clear chance case number one.
The case was submitted on "humanitarian" negligence in failing to stop
and to slacken. In an opinion written by Judge Barrett, in which great
care was taken to state the facts, the court held that a submissible case
was made. The truck was moving at the slow speed of ten to fifteen miles
per hour, and there was evidence of ability to stop and to swerve the truck.
The time involved was about two seconds.
In this case, the defendant's sole cause instruction was held erroneous
for failure to hypothesize sufficient facts to establish the defense. This case
is one of several which represent a tendency toward strictness in the require-
ments of a sole cause instruction in a last clear chance or humanitarian case.
Douglas v. St. Louis Public Service Co. 46 This was a personal injury
action for damages by a passenger on a motor bus which collided with a
tractor-trailer truck at a street intersection. A judgment was rendered
45. 234 S.W. 2d 783 (Mo. 1950).
46. 231 S.W. 2d 157 (Mo. 1950).
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against the motor bus operator and appealed. It seems clear that the pas-
senger was physically helpless to extricate himself from the peril. The motor
bus operator was negligently inattentive or aware of the peril. Consequently,
this was a common law last clear chance case number one or number two.
However, the passenger, not being in control of either vehicle, had a per-
fectly good submissible case of primary negligence, as.is indicated in Judge
Westhues' opinion. This case was submitted on negligence in failing to
slacken. The judgment for the plaintiff was reversed and the cause remanded
because of the failure to give a converse humanitarian instruction requested
by the defendant.
Johnson v. St. Louis Public Service Co.47 This was a companion case
to Frandeka v. St. Louis Public Service Company, 4 decided by Division
Number One. The plaintiff in this case, a fire chief for whose death this
action was brought, was not driving the automobile in which he was riding.
The automobile was a fire department car equipped with radio and siren. It
collided with a motor bus at an intersection in downtown St. Louis while
answering a fire alarm. The case was submitted upon "humanitarian" negli-
gence for failure to stop, slacken the spedd of or swerve the bus. The sub-
mission was in the disjunctive. The plaintiff was negligently inattentative
and oblivious to his danger. The defendant bus operator was negligently
inattentive. Consequently, this was a true humanitarian case in which no
personal injuries were sustained by the defendant, so far as the record shows.
The supreme court held in this case that a submissible case was made in two
of the three assignments of humanitarian negligence. The record and evi-
dence differed from the record and evidence in the Frandeka case. The case
was reversed and remanded because of the submission of primary negli-
gence in a case in which the deceased was guilty of contributory negli-
gence as a matter of law. Assuming that the motor bus driver suffered
personal injuries in this collision, the question might well be asked whether
he also was entitled to recover against the fire chief's estate or the operator
of the fire chief's automobile.
Conclusion
The Missouri humanitarian doctrine, as distinguished from the common
law last clear chance doctrine, seems to be in peril itself. Perhaps the peril
is not imminent, but a re-examination of the propriety of the rule and the
47. 237 S.W. 2d 136 (Mo. 1951).
48. 234 S.W. 2d 540 (Mo. 1950).
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true humanitarian case seems to be in order. From the standpoint of results
to persons injured in casualties, an elimination of the true humanitarian
case will not make much difference. In fact, an elimination of the true
humanitarian case from Missouri jurisprudence would probably relieve a
great deal of the pressure toward conservative application of the common
law last clear chance cases. But, be that as it may, the law as a science,
based on experience as well as logic, would benefit from a careful re-examina-
tion of the bases of the humanitarian rule and its soundness.
Lack of sympathy with the harsh common law doctrine that contribu-
tory negligence bars recovery is responsible for creation of the last clear
chance rule and the humanitarian doctrine. If it is desired to abolish con-
tributory negligence as a defense it should be done by legislation in the
true humanitarian situation.
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